|Personal Web :
|Areas of Interest :
Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Bargaining, Repeated Games, Social Choice and Market Microstructure
Industrial Organization, Experimental Economics
- AB ÇP'ye Katılımı Özendirme Ödül Desteği - TUBITAK
- Louis-André Gérard-Varet Prize of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists, ASSET 2009 - the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists, ASSET
||Econometric Society, American Economic Association, Game Theory Society
|Özyurt, Selçuk (2016) "Building reputation in a war of attrition game: Hawkish or Dovish stance?", The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol.16, No.2, 797-816 (NA)|
|Özyurt, Selçuk (2015) "Bargaining, reputation and competition", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol.119, 1-17 (SSCI)|
|Özyurt, Selçuk (2015) "Searching for a bargain: power of strategic commitment", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol.7, No.1, 320-353 (SSCI)|
|Özyurt, Selçuk (2014) "Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining", Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.88, 250-259 (SSCI)|
|Working Paper / Technical Report|
|Andrabi, Tahir and Das, Jishnu and Khwaja, Asim I. and Özyurt, Selçuk and Singh, Niharika, "Upping the ante: the equilibrium effects of unconditional grants to private schools", June 2018|
|Özyurt, Selçuk, "Deception, exploitation and lifespan of buyer-seller relationship in experience goods markets", November 2017|
SU Öncesi Yayınları:
Bargaining, Reputation, and Competition. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 119 (2015): 1–17
Searching for a Bargain: Power of Strategic Commitment. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2015) 7(1): 320-353
Audience Costs and Reputation in Crisis Bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior (2014) 88: 250-259.
A General Impossibility Result on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Hyperfunctions, with M. Remzi Sanver. Games and Economic Behavior (2009) 66: 880-892.
An Impossibility for Strategy-Proof Resolute Social Choice Correspondences, with M. Remzi Sanver. Social Choice and Welfare (2008) 30: 89-101.