Özgür Kıbrıs and a recent PhD graduate of ours, Ipek Gursel Tapki (currently an assistant professor at Kadir Has University), published a joint paper in Games and Economic Behavior, a top game theory journal, on negotiation processes where the implications of disagreement depend on the identity of the agent who causes disagreement. In this paper, Kibris and Tapki proposed a way to model such negotiations by extending the standard model of bargaining and carried out an axiomatic analysis. In a related paper forthcoming in the Review of Economic Design, Ozgur Kibris analyzes bargaining models that only use ordinal preference information on the alternatives (as opposed to the standard “cardinal preferences” assumption which is rather unrealistic since it requires bargaining to take place on a set of lotteries.) Özgür shows that a list of standard axioms in the literature characterize a well-known ordinal bargaining rule by Shapley (1967). Ozgur Kibris has also recently contributed a chapter to the Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation (published by Springer in 2010) with a survey of the recent literature on cooperative bargaining theory, particularly on manipulation of bargaining procedures and on ordinal models of bargaining.