Kemal Kivanc Akox (link) from Higher School of Economics (Moscow) will present his paper entitled "Revenue Maximizing Matching Platforms" on Wednesday, 17th of April at 11.45. The seminar will be physical in FASS 2054 but it can also be followed online at the following link
https://sabanciuniv.zoom.us/j/91383976765
"Search in a Non-exclusive Online Matching Platform"
Abstract: " Every year more people around the world use dating platforms. Yet little is understood about the marriage markets when there are profit maximizing platforms operating in the market. We analyze a standard search and matching model of a marriage market but with a profit maximizing platform. Subscribers to the platform enjoy an additional flow of contacts through the platform in exchange for a flow-price for subscription. We first describe the set of search equilibria when there is a platform. Then, we construct the demand function that the platform faces concentrating on equilibria without coordination failures. We find that market demand may locally behave like "Giffen goods" as there are ranges of prices where the market demand increases with price. Furthermore, as the search frictions by the platform vanishes, the matching among the subscribers does not necessarily converge to the stable matching."
